A micro view of the transactions money market by Mark A. Zupan
Working Paper 8203 
A MICRO VIEW OF THE 
TRANSACTIONS MONEY MARKET 
by Mark A.  Zupan 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
The autnor would like to thank John Carlson, 
William Gavin, Steven Kaplan, K.J.  Kowalewski, 
William Morris, and E.J.  Stevens for their helpful 
comments and suggestions.  Joseph Kalt deserves 
sincere gratitude  for his constant patience, 
inspiration, and insight.  Kathryn Begy provided 
greatly appreciated typing assistance. 
Working papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland are preliminary materials, circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comment.  The 
views expressed herein are those of the author and 
not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
Septemoer 1982 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyA MICRO  VIEW  OF  THE 
TRANSACTIONS  MONEY  MARKET 
Contents 
I.  Introduction 
11.  Models  of the Transactions Money  Market 
A.  Beginner's  Version 
B.  A  Toy  for Intermediates 
B.1.  A Homogeneous  Good,  but Regulatory 
Distinctions 
8.2.  A  Nonhomogeneous  Good 
C.  Puzzles  for Experts  (to Hand  Wave  or Not  to 
Hand  Wave?) 
111.  Working  with the Models:  Comparative  Statics 
A.  Reserve Requirements 
A.1.  First Cut 
A.  2.  Second  Cut 
B.  Transactions Money  Price Floors 
B.1.  The  Intermediate Model 
8.2.  The  Imperfect Substitutes Model 
C.  Innovations 
IV.  Conclusion 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyA MICRO VIEW OF THE 
TRANSACTIONS MONEY MARKET 
Abstract 
This paper provides a micro-oriented, price-theoretic perspective on the 
transactions money market.  Such a perspective is useful for three reasons. 
First, it emphasizes that the supply of transactions money will depend on, 
among other things, the state of technology in the transactions-money- 
producing industry, the price of transactions money, the cost of factors of 
production utilized to manufacture transactions money, and the prices of 
substitutes for and complements of transactions money--types of determinants 
that are commonly taken into account in the specification of a supply curve 
of commodities other than transactions money but have been given either 
little attention or ignored in the case of transactions money. Second, a 
micro perspective can also deal with the fact that transactions money is not 
a homogeneous good--provided that the costs of transforming/transporting  the 
different money forms to a homogeneous state are specifiable  (the divisi  a 
approach to monetary aggregation notably takes a percentage transformation/ 
transportation cost approach).  Third, a micro perspective affords a framework 
for comparative statics--i  .e.,  for estimating the a1  locative and distributive 
consequences of such aspects of the market as reserve requirements  (a 
percentage tax on regulated transactions money producers),  i  nterest-rate 
cei  1  ings  (transactions money price floors)  , and improvements in technology Or 
innovations  (outward  shifts of the transact  ions money supply curve--contrary 
to the currently popular approach, which models such innovations as inward 
shifts of the demand curve for transactions money). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In reviewing the literature on the concept of transactions money and 
on the nature of the transactions money market, it is surprising to note 
the tendency with which economists rely on a "macro" perspective.  In 
analyzing and predicting the level of and changes in transactions money 
variables, economists favor  (with  the possible exception of  Pesek 1976) 
rule-of-thumb and  broad causal arguments at the expense of a more 
fundamental "microu-oriented (price-theoretic)  approach.  To determine 
the supply of transactions money, for example, a money multiplier is 
standard fare  (with  assumptions being made about the currency-deposi  ts 
ratio desired by the public and the reserves-deposits ratio maintained by 
the banks).  Little attention is given to the state of technology in the 
transactions-money-producing industry, the cost of factors of production 
utilized to manufacture transactions money, the price of transactions 
money, and the prices of substitutes for and complements to transactions 
money; yet, these types of determinants typically are taken into account 
in the specification of a supply curve of commodities other than 
transactions money. 
The prevalence of macro perspectives probably derives from the tilt 
toward macro-analysis in the training of economists studying transactions 
money.  It may also, although less likely, stem from a perception that 
micro-analysis is either unfruitful in or inapplicable to the case of 
transactions money.  This paper attempts to erode such a perception and 
to point to how macro-trained economists may benefit from occasionally 
wearing micro eyeglasses. 
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micro perspective appears to be both tractable and useful.  Its usefulness is 
two-fold.  First, it  provides a convenient way of characterizing the 
transactions money market.  Why not treat transactions money as a good 
produced and consumed by participants in  a market  (albeit a good with 
distinctive attributes and a market with pecul  iar features)?  Second, a 
micro-oriented approach affords a framework for comparative statics.  Once the 
transactions money market is modeled, "tried-and-tested" micro-analytic 
techniques exist for estimating the allocative and distributive impacts of 
such aspects of the market as reserve requirements, transactions money price 
floors, and changes in technology  (innovations). 
While future work will hopefully put some empirical meat on the 
theoretical bones assembled here, this paper outlines a method for depicting 
the market and for undertaking comparative static analyses.  It is a skeleton 
at best--open to criticism and elaboration.  Nevertheless, it is intended to 
show how a micro perspective on the transactions money market may be 
developed.  Benefits from such a perspective will perhaps accrue to academics 
as well as to "real worldu  policymakers who regulate transactions money. 
11.  MODELS OF THE TRANSACTIONS MONEY MARKET 
A.  Beginner's Version 
In its simplest form, the transactions money market may be characterized 
uat  i  ons  : 
++?  -  -  + 
[I]  S  =  S(Ptm,  TEC, G,  Pfop, Ps, PC,...); 
-  ++  +  ?+- 
121  D =  D(Ptm, TA, Y, POP, DIST, Ps, PC ,...  ). 
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1.  An  increasing function of the price of transactions money,  Ptm. 
Holding everything else constant,  that is,  a rise in  the price of 
transactions money  will  result in  an  increase in  the quantity of 
transactions money  supplied. 
2.  An  increasing function  of the level of technology,  TEC,  available to 
firms manufacturing  transactions money.  Innovations such  as  EFT  and 
ATM,  for example,  will  shift the supply of transactions money  outward. 
3.  An  uncertain function  of  the goals,  G,  of  transactions-money- 
producing  firms--depending on  whether  these firms are 
sales-maximizers,  satisficers,  or profit-maximizers. 
4.  A  decreasing  function of the price of the factors of production, 
fo  utilized in  the manufacture  of  transactions money--labor 
(e.g:,  tellers),  capital  (e.g.,  computers),  energy  (e.g.,  1  ighting or 
heating expenditures) , and  high-powered money.  A  rise,  for instance, 
in  the cost of high-powered money--via an  increase in  the discount 
rate or open market purchases of securities by the Federal 
Reserve--will shift the supply of transac~tions  money  inward  (other 
things equal). 
5.  A  decreasing  function of the price of substitutes,  Ps  (e.g., 
barter). 
6.  An  increasing function of the price of complements,  PC  (e.g., 
marketpl  aces) . 
The  aggregate demand  for transactions money  will  be  (ceteris paribus): 
1.  A decreasing function of the price of transactions money. 
2.  An  increasing function of  the intensity of preferences or tastes,  TA, 
for transactions money.  The  demand  for transactions money  can be 
expected to shift outward,  for example,  if the members  of an  economy 
renounce  their beliefs in  communism  and  decide to  live according to 
the tenets of libertarianism. 
3.  An  increasing function of an  economy's  per capita income  level,  Y 
(provided that transactions money  is a normal  good). 
4.  An  increasing function  of  an  economy's  population,  POP. 
5.  An  uncertain function of the distribution of income  in  an  economy, 
DIST. 
6.  An  increasing function of the price of substitutes. 
,  A decreasing function  of the price of complements. 
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determine, according to standard economic analysis, the prevailing price and 
quantity of transactions money in the economy. 
Leaving aside for now the issue of a precise definition of transactions 
money, demanders  (i  .e.,  consumers) of transactions money are assumed to 
include both firms and  individuals.  Suppliers of transactions money are 
presumed to consist of all firms manufacturing a product capable of being used 
for making payments.  Transactions money producers, therefore, will  include 
not only banks but also money market mutual funds, credit card companies, and 
any other establishments that supply a good having the ability to serve as a 
payments mechanism. 
€3.  A Toy for Intermediates 
The beginner's version of the transactions money market fails to account 
for two significant features of the market:  1)  the presence of a complex 
regulatory matrix; and 2) the fact that transactions money is not a 
homogeneous good.  While the former characteristic may be readily incorporated 
into a micro-analytic model, the latter makes such a model problematic if not 
intractable. 
13.1.  A Homogeneous Good, but Regulatory Distinctions 
The transactions money market is subject to a plethora of federal and 
state regulations--reserve requirements, interest-rate ceilings, capital and 
insurance requirements, proscriptions against vertical and  horizontal 
integration by suppliers (e.g.,  the McFadden Act),  credit controls, subsidized 
check-clearing services, and entry restrictions  (e.g.,  International Banking 
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they do  not,  per -  se,  render  a micro approach  to  the transactions money  market 
meaningless.  In fact,  provided that all forms  of transactions money  are 
perfect substitutes  (e.g.,  currency,  demand  deposits,  money  market mutual 
funds),  micro-analysis of the effect of these regulations may  prove quite 
fruitful. 
To  start with the simplest case,  assume  that only federal regulations 
exist (via the Federal Reserve System)  and  that only one  of two  sectors of the 
domestic  transactions-money-producing industry falls under  the auspices of the 
Fed;  the other sector is  completely unregulated.  As  long as  the good  (i.e., 
transactions money)  produced by the two  sectors is  homogeneous,  the 
transactions money  market may  be  depicted by Figure 1,  where  Stmr  represents 
the supply of transactions money  regulated by the Fed,  Stmu  represents the 
supply of unregulated transactions money,  and  S is  the aggregate  supply of 
transactions money  in  the economy. 
Several  points are in  order  about  a Figure 1 conception of the 
transactions money  market.  First,  both Stmr  and  Stmu  are functions of the 
Figure 1 
Regulated Sector  Unregulated Sector  Transactions Money  Market 





I  I 
Q*tmr  Qtmr  Q*tmu  Qtmu  Q*  Q 
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magnitude of Stmr  and  Stmu  need  not be  identical (their relative slope and 
magnitude  in  Figure 1 are intended for exposition and  not for accurate 
representation).  A1 1 that matters is  that regulated and  unregulated 
transactions money  are perfect  substitutes (i  .e.,  that they sell at the same 
price,  P*).  Third,  the aggregate supply of transactions money  is  determined 
by the horizontal sum  of Stmr  and  Stmu.  At the prevailing price P*,  for 
example,  Q*tmr  +  QktmU  =  Q*  (this wi  11 be  the case  at any  price level,  not 
just P*).  Fourth,  the price of  transactions money  is  still determined by the 
interaction of the aggregate supply,  S,  and  demand,  D,  for transactions 
money--as  was  the case  in  the beginner's  version.  Finally,  the supply of 
transactions money  can  be broken down  into not only two but into any  number  of 
Sectors--depending on  the "segmentation effects" of existing federal  and  state 
regulations and  the extent to  which such regulations are deemed  to  be  of 
relevance to  an  objective examination of  the transactions money  market. 
Theoretically,  at least,  there could be  n sectors as  long as  the goods  being 
produced by all of  the different sectors were homogeneous. 
8.2.  A Nonhomogeneous  Good 
If  the products manufactured  by transactions money  suppliers are not all 
perfect  substitutes,  a Figure 1 depiction of the transactions money  market 
does  not apply.  Some  version of such a conception might be  redeemed,  however, 
if the nonhomogeneous  goods  could be  transformed/transported  to the "perfect 
tutes state
u  at either constant,  fixed,  or percentage cost. 
Suppose,  for example,  that there are two types of transactions mon 
y market mutual  funds  (MMMFs)  and  demand  deposits.  MMMFs  differ from 
demand  deposits in  that the former  serve as  a store of value,  in  addition to 
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transformable/transportable  into demand  deposits  at constant cost--it takes 
$0.05  to ship $1.00  of MMMFs  to  a demand-deposit  account.  This  situation is 
represented in  Figure 2,  where  SMMMF is  the supply of MMMFs,  SDD is  the 
supply of demand  deposits,  and  S
t
MMMF  is  the supply of pure transactions 
money  inherent  in SMMMF (SMMMF  is  transformable/transportable into demand 
deposits  at a constant cost of A6  =  $0.05). 
Figure 2 differs from Figure 1 only in  that the aggregate  supply of 
transactions money  in  the economy,  S,  is  determined by the horizontal sum  of 
 st^^^^  and  s~~ hot  S~~~~  and  SDD)  .  At the prevai  1  ing price P*tm, 
that is,  Q*  =  Q*DD  +  QtMMMF  (not Q*  =  Q*DD  +  Q*MMMF).  Analogous  to 
Figure 1,  Figure 2  may  be  generalized to  the n-sector case--with the supply 
emanating  from each  sector being transformab~e/transportable  into "pure" 
transactions money  at a constant  cost (note that transformation/transportation 
costs may  vary across  sectors). 
As  a  furtner generalization,  the transformation/transportation  cost need 
not be  constant.  The  cost may  be  a fixed or percentage cost.  It is 
Figure 2 
MMM Fs  Demand  Deposits  Transactions Money  Market 
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money  (see, for example, Barnett and Spindt 1982) opts for essentially a 
percentage transformation/transportation cost approach.  An economist relying 
on a divisia measure attempts to ascertain the percentage of each particular 
form of transactions money that is "pure."  A weight ranging from zero on up 
is assigned to each form of transactions money--the greater magnitude of the 
weight, the purer the transactions money form.  Weights are determined by the 
user cost of each form of transactions money--by the extent to which the 
return on a particular form of transactions money to the consumer is less than 
the return on an asset valued primarily for its attribute of serving as a 
store of value.  A divisia measure is thus a weighted average of various forms 
of transactions money--not a simple sum as are M-1, M-2, M-3, and L. 
In the two-sector case  (pure  and nonpure),  a divisia approach to 
deriving an estimate of the aggregate supply of transactions money may be 
depicted in Figure 3, where S  represents the supply of pure transactions 
tmp 
money  Y  Stm  nts the supply of nonpure transactions money, and S
t
tmn 
represents the supply of pure transactions money inherent in the supply of 
nonpure transactions money. 
Nonpure Transactions Money  Pure Transactions Money  Transactions Money Market 
Sector  Sector 
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fact that the transformation/transportation cost is  not constant--it is  a 
percentage  cost  (ABfCD).  The  vertical distance between  Stmn  and  Sttmn  is 
a constant percentage.  The  extent to  which  Sftmn  is  an  inward pivot of 
'tmn  depends  (monotonical ly) on  the "pure moneyness" weight  (ranging from 0 
to  1)  assigned  to the nonpure form of transactions money  (via calculation of 
user  cost as  described above).  The  lower  the weight,  the further inward is 
the pivot. 
A divisia measure  of transactions money  admittedly might be  fraught with 
difficulties.  It would be  an  inappropriate technique,  for example,  if  nonpure 
transactions money  could not be  rarefied via application of  the above- 
described transformation/transportation  cost method--if this were  the case, 
however,  simple  aggregation of  all imperfectly substitutable forms  of 
transactions money  would also be  incorrect.  The  divisia approach  would  also 
prove troublesome if the assigned "pure moneyness" weights were  inaccurate; 
i.e.,  if user costs were  not a reliable indicator of the pureness  of various 
forms  of transactions money. 
At first  glance,  however,  a divisia approach  seems  to  hold potential for 
being  a superior method for ascertaining the supply of transactions money  in 
an  econorny,  The  broader the monetary  aggregate under  examination,  the more 
accurate will  be  the divisia approach;  note that divisia and  simple-sum 
estimates diverge more  for  M-2  or M-3  than for M-1--the substitutability of 
ney forms  included in  M-1  is  greater than for those forms  included in  M-2 
-3.  Finally,  one  co  peculate about  what  would happen  as  the 
store-of-value and  mediu  xchange  attributes of money  become  more 
inseparable.  In  the near future,  for example,  analysts foresee MMMFs 
operating with no  limits on  check  size (current minimum  limits range from $5 
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around $1,000).  If  technological  advances  permit MMMFs  to offer such 
accounts,  one  would expect the amount  of pure transactions money  in  an  economy 
(measured  along divisia 1  ines)  to  decline drastically.  Furthermore,  as  the 
stock  (store-of-val  ue)  and  flow (medium-of -exchange)  attributes of  money 
become  further intertwined ("bundled together"),  it  would foreseeably become 
more  difficult for policymakers to  effect monetary  policy via control of basic 
monetary aggregates. 
C.  Puzzles for Experts  (to Hand  Wave  or Not  to  Hand  Wave?) 
If  the perfect  substitutes case  does  not apply and  if  the transformation/ 
transportation cost remedy  is  inapplicable,  micro-analysis of  the transactions 
money  market  becomes  quite difficult.  In this "puzzle for  experts" case,  two 
approaches  are available.  First,  one  can  fall back  on  broad causal 
arguments.  If,  for  instance,  nonpure  and  pure transactions monies  exist and 
are imperfect  substitutes,  the following line of reasoning might be  adopted 
when  the demand  for  nonpure  transactions money  shifts outward:  1)  the price 
and  quantity of nonpure  transactions money  will  rise;  2)  the demand  for pure 
transactions money  (a substitute for nonpure  transactions money)  wi  11 shift 
transactions money  wi  11 
oney  wi  11 rise, 
e or decrease  (depending on  the relative 
slopes  and  the extent of  shifts of the pure transactions money  supply and 
t  ion between 
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the alternative transactions money forms.  Such estimation, however, would 
probably be subject to severe multicollinearity problems.  Specifically, a 
properly specified system of equations would have to include the prices of 
substitute goods--prices that, depending on the number of transactions money 
forms that are deemed to be substitutes, tend to be extremely collinear. 
111.  WORKING WITH THE MODELS:  COMPARATIVE STATICS 
It  is possible to analyze the effects of various regulatory and 
institutional aspects of the transactions money market.  This section will 
focus on the allocative and distributive consequences of three such aspects: 
reserve requirements, transactions money price floors, and innovations.  The 
comparative statics of these three aspects will be examined in the context of 
the intermediate model--i.e.,  under the assumption that the supply of 
tions money may come from either a regulated or an unregulated sector 
and that the good produced by both of these sectors is homogeneous.  This 
approach is adopted for the sake of simplicity in exposition.  Whenever 
possible, however, modifications of the intermediate model will be 
noted--modif  ications necessitated by either the perfect-substi  tutes-wi  th 
transformation/transpor  the imperfect substitutes cases. 
A.  Reserve Requirements 
Reserve requirements  (RR)  force producers of regulated transactions money 
to hold a fixed percentag  erves  (either  vault c  osits with the 
Fed) against the amount of  deposits  (transacti  Y SUPP~Y. 
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by regulated suppliers,  a proscribed fraction of  that output must  be held in 
the form of sterile reserves (no interest accrues  to  banks  from vault cash  or 
deposits at the Fed). 
A.1.  First Cut 
Characterizing RR  as  a percentage  tax on  producers of transactions money 
regulated by the Fed,  the effects  of such  a tax are depicted in  Figure 4, 
where  Sitmr  is  the supply of  transactions money  from the regulated sector 
after the imposition of the RR  tax,  S'  is  the total supply of transactions 
money  following the imposition of  the RR  tax,  and  all other symbols  are as 
before. 
The  allocative effects of the RR  tax (ceteris paribus)  include: 
1.  An  increase in  the price of transactions money  from Pktm  to PItm. 
2.  A decrease  in  the total quantity of  transactions money  supplied 
from Q*  to Q'. 
Figure 4 
Regulated Sector  Unregulated Sector  Transactions Money  Market 
* 
Q ' tmr  Q*tmr  tmu  Q'tmu  Qtmu  Q'  Q*  Q 
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f  ram Q*tmu  to Q'  tmu- 
4.  A decrease in the quantity of regulated transactions money 
f  ram Q*tmr  to Q'tmr- 
5.  A deadweight loss to the economy represented by area ABC. 
The distributive effects of the RR  tax  (ceteris  paribus) include: 
1.  A loss to consumers of transactions money equal to area 
P*tmP'tmAB. 
2.  A gain to producers of unregulated transactions money represented by 
area JKTE. 
3.  A gain/loss to producers of regulated transactions money--depending 
on whether the beneficial effect of an increase in the price of 
transactions money  (area  LMHG)  outweighs/is outweighed by the 
deleterious effect of the RR  tax  (area  NHF). 
4.  A gain to the  RR  tax collector  (i.e.,  the Fed) equal to area NGR. 
The net value of the distributive effects of the RR  tax will be negative 
and equal to area ABC--the deadweight loss from the tax to the economy as a 
whole. 
antify the above-out  1  ined a1  locative and distributive effects  (aka 
the triangles-and-rectangles-approach to economics),  one would need to know: 
1.  The own-price elasticity of the demand for transactions money. 
2.  The quantity of transactions money produced by both the regulated and 
unregulated sectors, either before or after the tax. 
3.  The elasticities of the supply curves for regulated and unregulated 
transactions money. 
The f  i  rst-cut  tation 
.  First, under the Depository 
of the RR  tax may be refined in several 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
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Control Act of  1980,  KK  are scheduled to be phased  in  by September  3,  1987, 
for all depository institutions,  including commercial  banks,  mutual  savings 
banks,  savings  and  loan associations,  credit unions,  agencies  and  branches  of 
foreign banks,  and  Edge  corporations;  previously only member  banks  were 
subject to tne RR  tax.  In addition,  reserve requirements are scheduled to be 
3  percent for net transaction accounts  up  to  $26  million and  12  percent for 
any  amount  of net transaction accounts  over $26  million.  The  phase-in of the 
new  RR  tax schedules may  be  represented by the outward pivoting of the Sttmr 
curve in  Figure 5 toward  the Stmr  curve (the RR  tax was  higher for regulated 
firms prior to the passage  of the Monetary  Control Act). 
The  imposition of a RR  tax on  previously unregulated producers can  be 
characterized by either subdividing the unregulated sector  in  Figure 4  into 
"newly
n  regulated and  unregulated sectors  (e.g.,  MMMFs  are sti  11 not subject 
to  the RR  tax) or else by transferring  the  regulated portion of the 
unregulated supply curve into the regulated sector.  The  latter approach is 
shown  in  Figure 6,  where  Sttmr  is  the supply of regulated transactions money 
Figure 5 
Regulated Sector  of the Transactions Money  Market 
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unregulated transactions money after implementation of the Monetary Control 




  'tmu  - "tmr  -I.  "tmu  =  S. 
Whether the deadweight loss of the RR  tax will increase with the 
implementation of the Monetary Control Act will depend on the relative impacts 
of:  1)  the decreased tax on previously regulated producers and 2)  the 
imposition of a RR tax on a portion of the previously unregulated sector. 
The fact that net transactions accounts exceeding $26 million are taxed 
at a 12 percent rate rather than at a 3 percent rate may be considered by 
distilling from the regulated sector those firms with net accounts greater 
than $26  million and representing the supply curves of such firms as shown in 
Figure 7; Where SZ6  is the supply curve for a representative  firm with net 
transactions accounts greater than $26 million and S'26 is the supply curve 
for such a firm after imposition of the RR  tax  (Monetary Control Act 
Figure 6 
Regulated Sector  Unregulated Sector 
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version).  Note that the new supply curve is discontinuous at the quantity of 
$26 million--representing the fact that the marginal tax rate jumps from 3 
percent to 12 percent at this point. 
Second, the first-cut depiction of the RR  tax does not account for the 
transactions money might hold reserves even in the 
(1979)  conjectures that, without RR, 
producers would hold  1  percent reserves.  Estimates of the 
he nonregulated case could also be derived by 
1  ated producers  (e. g.,  state-chartered banks).  The 
uld hold reserves in  the absence 
ic  problem.  It simply implies 
Regulated Transactions Money Producerswith Net Transactions Accounts 
f regulated transactions money, Stmr,  should 
have been pivoted inward b  ount of  esired without RR, 
S"tmr, as shown in Figure 8.  Note that  at Qitmr  (or  at  any output 
level)  imposition of a RR  tax is relatively less onerous  (AB  <  AC) and 
>  $26 Million  - 
tm j6  I 
1 
7  I 
$26 Million  tm 
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involves relatively less significant allocative and distributive impacts for 
the transactions money market. 
Third, the first-cut characterization of the RR  tax may easily be 
adapted to the perfect-substitutes-with-transformation/transportation  case. 
One would simply apply tne same analysis after filtering out the "nonpure" 
portions of the regulated and nonregulated transactions money supply curves 
(under  the divisia approach, for example, one might take only a percentage of 
the unregulated transactions money supply curve).  In the case of imperfect 
substitutes, however, a study of the effects of the RR  tax would be more 
difficult.  Nevertheless, one might still, after econometric estimation of 
simul  taneou  for both the regulated and  unregulated transactions money 
markets, be able to estimate partially the consequences of a RR  tax; partially 
only, since the RR-tax-induced increase in the price of regulated transactions 
money would shift both the demand for and supply of unregulated transactions 
money--1  imitin  sis of the effects of the RR  tax on the unregulated 
sector. 
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Fourth,  the first-cut depiction of the RR  tax can  provide at least a 
partial explanation of  why  unregulated transactions money  has  increased so 
rapidly in  the U.S.  economy.  If, for instance,  the demand  for  money  shifts 
outward  (ceteri  s pari  bus) --ei  ther because  of the government  (from the deficit) 
or individuals and  businesses  (from short-term f  inanci  a1  strains)--then it  can 
be  expected that both the burden  of the RR  tax on  regulated producers  will 
rise and  the supply of  unregulated transactions money  will increase,  as  shown 
in  Figure 9. 
With an  increase in  the demand  for  transactions money,  the quantity of 
unregulated transactions money  increases  from Qitmu  to  Qiitmu  and  the 
quantity of regulated transactions money  rises from Qttmr  to  QNtmr.  While 
unregulated producers  benefit by an  amount  equal  to area ABCT,  regulated 
producers  gain/lose--depending  on  whether  area EFGH  outweighs/is  outweighed by 
area HIJG  (the burden of the RR  tax rises by area HIJG  with the demand-induced 
increase in  the price of  transactions money).  The  tax collector (i  .e.,  the 
Fed)  gains  additional revenue equal  to  area HIJG. 
Figure  9 
Regulated Sector  Unregul  a ted Sector  Transactions Money  Market 
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else remains constant.  This assumption ignores the benefits the Fed derives 
from relying on RR in effecting monetary policy.  Specifically, through RR, 
the Fed is capable of:  1)  directly control  1  ing the money supply; 2) 
preventing possible externalities attendant to bank failures resulting from 
insufficient reserves; and 3) minimizing the relative impact of variabi  1  i  ty in 
excess reserves on the variability in the quantity of transactions money  (and 
thus on the income and price levels in the economy).  While changes in RR have 
very rarely been used for the first reason and while Cagan  (1979)  argues that 
the second reason is obviated by deposit insurance, an active federal funds 
market, and the Federal Reserve as a lender of  last resort, the third reason 
does appear to be a possible justification for RR.  As Cagan points out, RR 
make excess reserves "a smaller or more constant fraction of total reserves." 
It is conceivable that the benefits of  RR vis-i-vis excess reserves might be 
measured by:  1)  estimating the level of excess reserves that would prevail in 
a non-RR world; 2)  predicting the heightened variability in total reserves 
that would result from the relatively higher level of excess reserves in  the 
non-RR world; 3) estimating the increased vari  abi  1  i ty in national income and 
prices that would result from the greater variabilty of total reserves; and 4) 
comparing the costs of this variability with the allocative cost (i.e., 
deadweight loss) of a RR tax. 
Finally, working from the first-cut approximation, it is also possible 
to speculate about the effect of  attempts to make the RR tax universal--to 
meld the unregulated with the regulated sector in Figure 4.  While more finely 
ecified regulations may afford  greater universality, it is doubtful whether 
a11 of the unregulated sector may ever be transferred into the regulated 
sector.  Furthermore, if the RR tax is a burdensome one, transactions money 
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producers may be expected to vote with both their physical and mental feet 
(they  wi  11 devise ways of circumventing existing regulations and getting back 
into the unregulated sector--e.g.,  RPs).  New firms will also be given the 
incentive to enter the unregulated sector--firms that may be less susceptible 
to the Fed (e.g.,  foreign banks) and that may create a product that is a much 
more difficult form of transactions money to monitor and control  (e.g., 
Merri  11 Lynch's parking-lot money). 
5.  Transactions Money Price Floors 
Regulations of the payment of interest on various forms of transactions 
money are commonplace.  There is, for example, a legal prohibition against 
banKs paying any interest on demand deposits.  NOW accounts may only pay 5.25 
percent. 
Why are such interest rate ceilings actually price floors?  The reason for 
this apparent anomaly is rather simple.  By limiting the amount of interest 
that producers of transactions money may pay on certain forms of transactions 
accounts, such regulations effectively dictate a user cost (i.e.,  a 
transactions money price) to consumers of such transactions accounts.  The 
level of this user cost will  vary positively and monotonically with the market 
rate of interest; i.e.,  the greater the interest rate, the higher will be the 
user cost of the regulated transactions money  (other  things equal and  provided 
that tne interest-rate ceiling is effective).  The user cost of transactions 
money likewise will vary negatively and monotonically with the level of the 
tally proscribed interest-rate ceiling. 
Assuming that both regulated and unregulated suppliers of transactions 
money produce a homogeneous good (and  thus that consumers/demanders of 
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transactions money cannot be differentiated along regulated market/unregulated 
market 1  ines) , the imposition of a nonuniversal interest-rate cei  1  ing on the 
transactions money market may be depicted by Figure 10, where WBC  represents 
the supply of regulated transactions money before the imposition of the 
interest-rate ceiling, ABC  represents the supply of regulated transactions 
money after the imposition of the interest-rate ceiling, PKJNO is the 
aggregate supply of transactions money before the interest-rate ceiling 
regulation, MLINO is the aggregate supply of transactions money after the 
imposition of the interest-rate ceiling, and all other symbols are as before. 
Note that the supply of regulated transactions money becomes horizontal at the 
level of the user cost floor  (this  level will vary with the market rate of 
interest and  the interest-rate cei  1  ing)  .  Up to quantity Q"t.ry regul  ated 
transactions money producers would be willing to supply their product at a 
lower price than PItm to consumers, since the cost to the producers of 
supplying their product falls below the user cost to consumers (i.e.,  the 
price consumers wi 1  1  pay for the product)  .  Interest-rate cei  1  i  ngs prevent 
suppliers from doing so  (exceptions to this are noted below),  however, and 
force consumers of such regulated goods onto the price floor AB. 
Figure 10 
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transactions money will  be the horizontal sum of Stmu  and ABC.  The 
aggregate supply of transactions money will thus be equal to Stmu  below the 
price of Pttm,  have a horizontal segment at PItm, and  be equal to the sum 
Of  Stmu and ABC above the price of PItm. 
The allocative consequences of  an effective interest-rate ceiling  (ceteris 
paribus) include: 
1.  An increase in the price of transactions money from P*tm to PItm. 
2.  A decrease in the aggregate quantity of transactions money 
from Q*  to Q'. 
3.  An increase in the quantity of unregulated transactions money 
from Q*tmu  to Q'tmu* 
4.  A decrease in the quantity of regulated transactions money 
from Qktmr to Q1tmr.  Note that Q1tmr  =  Q' -  Q1tmu. The 
quantity Qttmr  will fall somewhere to the left of Q*tmr--its 
exact location will  be determined by the elasticity of Stmu.  The 
more elastic Stmu,  the more will the quantity of regulated 
transactions money decline following the imposition of an interest- 
rate ceiling. 
5.  A deadweight loss for the economy as a whole--represented by area IKJ. 
The distributive consequences of an effective interest-rate ceiling 
(ceteris  paribus) include: 
1.  A loss to consumers of transactions money equal to area 
P*tmP ' tmI  J. 
2.  A gain to producers of nonregulated transactions money equal 
to area EFGH. 
3.  A gain/loss to producers of regulated transactions money--depending 
on whether area ARTS is greaterlsmaller than area TUV. 
Analogous to the RR tax, the net wealth effect of an interest-rate 
ceiling will be negative and will be equal in magnitude to area IJK--the 
deadweight loss to the economy as a whole from an interest-rate ceiling. 
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hypotheses to be made about an interest-rate ceiling.  First, such a price 
floor toward consumers of transactions money provides another potential, if 
only partial, explanation for the recent increase in unregulated transactions 
money in the U.S.  economy.  The quantity of unregulated transactions money may 
be expected to increase with a rising price floor--caused, for example, by a 
rising market rate of interest. 
Second, if the price floor becomes high enough  (if  segment AB moves up 
sufficiently)  , regulated transactions money may be squeezed completely out of 
the market--provided that the aggregate demand for transactions money, D, 
intersects the aggregate supply at a quantity below the horizontal segment of 
the aggregate supply curve. 
Third, the higher the price floor for regulated transactions money, the 
less control the Fed will have over transactions money; the more the quantity 
of unregulated transactions money will increase and the more the quantity of 
regulated transactions money will decrease.  Thus, as market rates of interest 
rise, one would anticipate that the Fed would have progressively less control 
over transactions money  (ceteris  pari  bus).  The greater the el asticity of the 
supply of unregulated transactions money and the smaller the elasticity of the 
supply of regulated transactions money  (other  things equal),  the more quickly 
the Fed's control over transactions money would erode. 
Fourth, given that the cost of producing regulated transactions money is 
less than the legally proscribed price for such money  (below  the quantity 
Q  "tmr  ),  one would anticipate efforts on the part of regulated transactions 
money producers to lower the user cost  (i .e.,  price) of their product to 
potential consumers.  This argument might explain the payment of implicit 
interest on certain types of regulated transactions money--implicit interest 
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interest may be viewed as an attempt to compete away the rents  (area  ARTS) 
that regulated producers derive from interest-rate ceilings.  Payment of 
implicit interest may also be characterized as an effort to "convexify" the 
horizontal segment of the supply curve ABC--in the limit, an effort to get 
back onto the supply curve WBC. 
Fifth, while the RR tax may afford the Fed the benefit of minimizing the 
effect of variable excess reserves, no similar potentially redeeming virtue 
suggests itself in the case of interest rate ceilings.  If anything, 
transactions money price floors provide a "stable
N  and  predictable source of 
income for regulated suppliers that remain in the market.  This stability is 
eroded, however, both by the presence of unregulated producers and by the 
payment of implicit interest by regulated producers.  The higher the market 
rate of interest  (ceteris paribus),  the greater the erosion.  A stable source 
of income for surviving regulated suppliers is also obtained at the expense of 
both nonsurvivors and the Fed  (the  Fed's ability to control transactions money 
is eroded). 
Sixth, the regulated and unregulated sectors in the preceding analysis 
of transactions money price floors need not correspond to the regulated and 
unregulated sectors in  the case of the RR tax. 
Finally, the Intermediate Model approach to transactions money price 
floors may easily incorporate a transformation/transportation cost element 
(see Section 11.0.2.  above). 
B.2.  The Imperfect Substitutes Model 
If regulated and unregulated transactions money are imperfect 
substitutes  (and  non-transformabl  e/non-transportable to the perfect 
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substitutes case),  a different analytic approach is necessary.  Such an 
approach will  perhaps more clearly portray interest-rate ceilings as 
transactions money price floors. 
Suppose, for example, that there are two separate markets--one for 
regulates transactions money and one for unregulated transactions money--as 
shown in Figure 11, where Dtmr is the demand for regulated transactions 
money  , Dtmu is the demand for unregulated transactions money, EC is the 
supply of regulated transactions money prior to the imposition of an interest- 
rate ceiling, and all other symbols are as before. 
Suppose that with the imposition of an interest-rate ceiling, consumers 
of regulated transactions money are forced to pay a price (i.e.,  to bear a 
user cost) of PItmr.  Other things equal, the allocative effects of such a 
price floor will  include: 
1.  A change in the effective supply curve of regulated transactions 
money to P1tmrABC. 
2.  A decrease in the quantity of regulated transactions money 
from Q*tmr  to Qttmr. Although the value of the marginal unit of 
transactions money at quantity Qltmr exceeds the cost that must be 
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further expansion of regulated transactions money  (since  the 
effective user cost exceeds the price consumers are wi 1  ling to pay). 
3.  An excess supply of regulated transactions money at the price Pgtmr 
of AB =  QUtmr-QgtmU.  This excess supply or the fact that the 
cost of producing the marginal unit of transactions money exceeds the 
price consumers are willing to pay for that unit at Qgtmr  will 
foster attempts on the part of regulated transactions money producers 
to pay implicit interest--to stretch the effective supply 
curve P1tmrABC  toward the original supply curve EC. 
4.  An outward shift in the demand for unregulated transactions money due 
to the increase in  price of  a substitute good  (regulated  transactions 
money). 
5.  An inward shift in the supply of unregulated transactions money. 
6.  An increase in the price and an uncertain effect on the quantity of 
unregulated transactions money  (due  to the simultaneous shift in the 
supply of and demand for unregulated transactions money). 
7.  A deadweight loss in the regulated transactions money market equal to 
area AFG. 
While the distributive consequences of a price floor cannot be outlined 
for the unregulated market, they may easily be delineated for the regulated 
market: 
1.  A loss to regulated transactions money consumers equal to 
area P*tmrPitmrAG. 
2.  A gain/loss to regulated producers--depending on whether 
area P*tmrP'tmrAH is greater/smaller than area HGF. 
3.  A negative net wealth effect equal to area AFH  (a deadweight loss). 
C.  Innovations 
Although innovations have occurred in both the regulated and unregulated 
sectors of the transactions money market, the following examination will focus 
on innovations in the unregulated sector.  This approach is adopted for three 
reasons.  First, it appears that innovations in the transactions money market 
ave occurred predominantly in the unregulated sector (e.g .  , money market 
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Best available copymutual  funds).  Second,  innovations  in  the unregulated sector pose a greater 
threat to the Fed's  ability to  monitor and  control transactions money.  Third, 
future innovations  will  most  likely occur in  the unregulated sector--via the 
introduction of forms  of  money  that bundle together medium-of-exchange  and 
store-of-value attributes. 
Innovations  are taken  to be  a form of  technological change  and  are repre- 
sented below  as  outward  shifts of  the supply curve of  unregulated transactions 
money.  An  outward shift in  the supply of  unregulated transactions money  must 
be distinguished from  an  increase --  in  the quantity supplied of unregulated 
transactions money--the  latter results from  the imposition of either a RR  tax 
or a transactions money  price floor.  While this distinction is  straight- 
forward theoretically, it  may  be  quite difficult to  make  empirically. 
Innovations are assumed  to include one-bank  holaing companies,  advances  in 
communications  and  electronics,  RPs,  MMMFs,  Eurodollars,  and  other new  forms 
of  unregulated transactions money.  Innovations,  therefore,  involve both 
actual technological changes  and  entry by new  producers  into the unregulated 
sector  (e.g.,  Sears). 
An  innovation in  the unregulated  sector may  be  depicted as  in  Figure 12, 
where  Sttmu  is  the supply of unregulated transactions money  following an 
Figure 12 
Regulated Sector  Unregul  ated Sector  Transactions  Money  Market 
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innovation, and all  other symbols are as before. 
The allocative effects of an  innovation include: 
1.  A decrease in the price of transactions money from P*tm to P't,. 
2.  An increase in the aggregate quantity of transactions money from Q* 
to Q'. 
3.  A decrease in the quantity of regulated transactions money 
f  ram Q*tmr  to Q'  tmr* 
4.  An increase in the quantity of  unregulated transactions money 
from Q*tmu to Q1tmu.  (The  expansionary effect of the innovation 
must outweigh the contractionary influence of a lower price--given 
that the aggregate quantity increases, while the quantity of 
regulated transactions money declines.) 
5.  No deadweight loss. 
The distributive effects of an innovation include: 
1.  A gain to consumers represented by area P*tmPItmGF. 
2.  A loss to producers of regulated transactions money equal to area 
CEIH. 
3.  A gain/loss to producers of unregulated transactions money--depending 
on whether area MNLK exceeds/is exceeded by area ABKJ. 
Note that innovations provide another possible explanation both for the recent 
rapid increase in  unregulated transactions money and for the simultaneous 
decline in the Fed's ability to monitor and control transactions money. 
Figure 12 also allows one to hypothesize that if an innovation is 
extensive enough  (if  the supply curve of unregulated transactions money shifts 
out far enough),  regulated transactions money could be squeezed out of the 
market altogether.  This might happen, for example, if an innovation allowed 
the bundling of money's store-of-value and medium-of-exchange attributes at 
minimal cost.  The squeezing out of regulated transactions money, however, 
would occur only if the Fed had no ability to "capturen (e.g.,  via 
legislation) new forms of unregulated transactions money. 
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While other aspects of the transact  ions money market (e.g.,  subsidized 
check-clearing processes, deposit insurance, and capital requirements) are 
capable of being analyzed from a micro perspective, the preceding section has 
focused on the comparative statics associated with only three central 
aspects:  reserve requirements, transactions money price floors  (i  nterest-rate 
ceilings),  and innovations.  The analysis highlights the fact that a micro 
approach may afford a better conceptual grasp of the transactions money market 
than a macro approach.  While much more empirical and theoretical work will be 
required, the above-out1  i ned models are intended to generate interest in and 
discussion about a perspective on the transactions money market that is "less 
traveled by."  Such a micro perspective, at least as far as regulatory 
decision making goes, might end up making ''all the difference." 
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